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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unemployment insurance (UI) in the U.S. is financedthrough a payroll
tax that is imperfectly experience rated,and thus only partially reflects a
firm's use of the system. As a result, certain firms andindustries receive
many more dollars in unemploymentbenefits than they pay in taxes. We
document that the same patterns of large interindustrysubsidies have per-
sisted for over 30 years, and we find that these subsidies aredue mostly to
differences in layoff rates across industries. Agriculture,mining, manu-
facturing, and particularly construction receive subsidies,while trade,
finance, insurance and real estate, and servicesconsistently pay more in
taxes than they receive. Additionally, usingpreviously unexamined firm
level data, we document a persistent pattern of interfirmsubsidies across
several years. Together, these results indicate that UIbenefit payments
This paper was prepared for the 1992 NBER conference on TaxPolicy and the Economy.
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are predictable, thus weakening arguments for incomplete experience rat-
ing that focus on its insurance value to firms faced with large layoffcosts.
We also find that the efficiency costs of the cross-subsidiesto less stable
industries may be large, but such calculations dependon differences
between marginal and average subsidies thatare difficult to estimate.
Unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States is financed through
an experience-rated payroll tax. That is to say, the tax rate for a firm
partly depends on the benefits paid to its employees. While the bulk of
the literature on the incentive effects of UI explores the relationship
between UI benefits and unemployment durations,a growing strand of
the literature focuses on this system of financing benefits throughan
experience-rated payroll tax.1 This UI payroll tax is quantitatively impor-
tant, currently raising over $20 billion annually. However, certain indus-
tries and firms receive many more dollars in unemployment benefits
than they pay in taxes, with this subsidization occurring at theexpense
of other industries and firms. While such a pattern of cross-subsidies is
expected in an insurance program at a given point in time, in fact the
patterns of subsidies persist, year after year, for the same industries and
firms. This continuous cross-subsidization will distort the efficient alloca-
tion of resources and increase the aggregate level of unemployment and
its accompanying societal costs. Thus, it is important to understandnot
only the size and patterns of interindustry and interfirm subsidies, but
also the degree and source of their persistence. It is also importantto
know the patterns of UI subsidies, because these likely affect the political
economy of support by different industries and firms for UI reform.
Because state UI programs vary in many dimensions,we present evi-
dence for a large number of states. We begin by documenting inter-
industry subsidies for the last dozen years using aggregate data. We find
that the same industries receive subsidies in almost all states and that the
subsidies are often very large. The subsidies have only fallen slightly since
the changes in the UI finance under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity Act of 1982 (TEFRA) were implemented in 1985. However, this fallcan
at least partly be attributed to the reduction in subsidies typically found in
better economic times. Even with such reforms, and despite themany
changes in the economy in the past decades, there is alsoa very close
correlation between the subsidies received during the last twelveyears
and those received thirty years ago.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) is an excellent recent survey of the literatureon UI
incentive effects, while important early works on UI financing includes Becker (1972),
Brechling (1977), Feldstein (1978), and Topel (1983). See Topel (1990) and Hamermesh
(1990) for recent work.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax113
We also analyze the sources of theseinterindustry subsidies by exam-
ining the relative importance of temporaryand permanent layoff rates,
unemployment durations, and wage andbenefit levels. We find that the
subsidies are directly attributable tohigher temporary layoff rates and,
to a lesser extent, to higherpermanent layoff rates. Higher industry UI
benefits per worker are also partlyresponsible, but relatively higher tax
rates and taxable wages in theseindustries and lower unemployment
durations tendto reduce the subsidy.
While this study and previous studies useindustry data to group
firms with presumably similar subsidies,industry data are really a proxy
for firm data. Firms within the sameindustry (especially a broadly de-
fined industry) may differ dramatically. Inthe past, however, firm panel
data on UI benefits received and taxespaid have not been available. We
use such data andfind that the variation in use of UI is as greatwithin
industry as it is across industries.While the same firms tend to receive
subsidies year after year, these firms are notconfined to those industries
that receive subsidies overall.Additionally, many firms in subsidized
industries consistently pay more in taxesthan they receive in benefits.
Thus, at both the firm and industrylevel, the patterns of redistribution
are predictable, suchthat the unemployment insurance systemhas a
strong element of persistentsubsidization. This subsidization reduces
labor costs and, thus, the cost ofproduction for unstable industries and
firms, and increases it for stable ones.In the case of an interindustry
subsidy, it is unlikely to lead to higherindustry profits, because entry
into the industry would tend to compete away anyabove-average prof-
its. Rather, the lower costs arelikely to be reflected in lower prices,
which allows unstable sectors to expand outputand employment.2 Be-
cause our industry groups arebroad, part of what we call interfirm
subsidies are really industry subsidies at afiner level and are likely to be
reflected in product prices. Again, the result is anexpansion of unstable
firms, which is subsidized by net taxes on morestable ones. However,
part of the firm level subsidieslikely increases profits without affecting
the allocation of resources across sectors.
The degree of persistence of firmlevel subsidies is important when
one is determininghow closely experience rated tax paymentsshould
reflect UI benefits received. While UIinsures workers against job loss,
incomplete experience rating of UI also insuresfirms against having to
pay the full UI costsof a large layoff. The rationale for this second typeof
2Deere (1991) examines evidence for such aneffect at the broad industry level, conclud-
ing that employment in construction issubstantially increased, while that in services is
decreased.114Anderson and Meyer
insurance to firms is diminished, however, if the frequencyof UI claims
at a given firm is highly predictable. Thus,our findings of strong persis-
tence in firm use of UI suggest that the firm levelinsurance costs of
tighter experience rating (at least for the large firmswe examine) may be
smaller than previously thought.
The patterns of UI subsidies alsoare likely to affect the political econ-
omy of support by different industries and firms for changes in UIlegisla-
tion. Because several billion dollarsare currently transferred between
industries, and these transfers would be affected bymany changes in the
UI system, support for reforms is likely affected bythese subsidies. The
paper proceeds with a brief summary of experience ratingsystems, before
presenting empirical findings on the persistence andcauses of interindus-
try and interfirm subsidies. We then estimate the efficiencycosts resulting
from the subsidies. The final section then offerssome conclusions.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCERATING
SYSTEMS
There are many possibleways to find UI benefits, including using gen-
eral revenues, employee contributions, employercontributions, or any
combination of these. The United States haschosen to finance its sys-
tem mainly through a tax on employers, with thetax rate based on some
measure of the firm's past experience with the UI system. Whileoverall
the tax is only 1.1 percent of totalwages and 2.1 percent of taxable
wages, the maximum rate (which varies by state) is typicallyover 6
percent and in several states reaches 10 percent. Currently,employers
must pay a 6.2 percent tax on the first $7,000 of eachemployee's wages
to the federal government.4 However, the law also providesfor a credit
of 5.4 percent to all employers payingstate taxes under an experience-
rated UI system. Thus, while each state is freeto implement its system
as it wishes, there is a strong incentive to implementan experience-rated
system, and all states have done so.
These state experience rating systems takemany forms, but the two
most common are reserve ratio (thirty states) andbenefit ratio experi-
ence rating (fifteen states).5 In a reserve ratio system,a firm's tax rate is a
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) discuss the systemscurrently used in some major
OECD countries.
Many states have tax bases higher than $7,000 for the stateportion of the tax.
See National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation& Workers' Compensation
(1990). Michigan and Pennsylvania are countedas benefit ratio states even though they
have hybrids of reserve ratio and benefit ratio systems.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax115
decreasing function of the difference between taxespaid and benefits
received divided by average covered payroll.Typically, payroll is aver-
aged over the past three years, while taxes paid andbenefits received are
summed over all past years and are not discounted.In a benefit ratio
system, a firm's tax rate depends onthe ratio of average benefits paid to
average taxable wages, whereboth are generally averaged over only the
last three years.
Under either system, firm tax rates change in steps asthese ratios
change. However, for most firms in almost all states,the tax rates do not
rise sufficiently when the ratios fall to cause firms to paythe full UI costs
of laying off a worker. Additionally, statutory minimumand maximum
tax rates imply that there are large ranges atthe top and bottom of the
tax schedule over which a firm's layoffbehavior has no effect on its tax
payments. Provisions such as these result inthe experience rating being
incomplete, so that a firm laying off an employee can expect to payback
less in future taxes than the full cost of thebenefits received by that
employee. As a result, the system provides anincentive to use tempo-
rary layoffs to adjust to demandfluctuations.6 Because each state system
attempts to balance taxes and benefits overthe long run, firms with
unstable employment are effectively subsidized bythe more stable
firms.
In order to clarify the effects of recent changes inexperience rating, we
describe in general terms how the range of ratesand tax base interact to
determine the tightness of experience rating. Inorder for benefit pay-
ments to affect a firm's tax payments, the taxrate needs to be able to
change in response to a firm's layoffs. Thus, awider range of rates is
generally associated with tighter experience rating.7 Inaddition, a given
change in the tax rate will have a greater effect onfuture tax payments if
the taxable wage base is higher.
Until reaching the maximum tax rate, a firm thatconsistently receives
more in benefits than it pays in taxeswill face higher future tax pay-
ments as it moves up the tax schedule.The more likely it is that a firm is
at the maximum rate, the looser isthe experience rating. Once at the
maximum rate, if a firm receives more benefits, itdoes not pay addi-
tional taxes to compensate and, thus, receives a puresubsidy. The more
likely this is to occur, the looser is the experiencerating. Thus, one
6 This is in comparison with a perfectly experience rated system. Thechoice of some
experience rating over no experience rating does encourageemployment stabilization.
However, given a fixed range of rates, there is a tradeoffbetween the size of the changes
in tax rates in response to changes in benefits and thefraction of firms that will be subject
to some change. This situation should make itclear that the range in rates is not a complete
characterization of the incentives of a tax schedule.116Anderson and Meyer
useful way of summarizing the extent of experience rating is themaxi-
mum level of firm unemployment that is consistent with taxes equaling
benefits for a maximum rate firm. Here unemployment ismeasured as
the fraction of a firm's workforce that is unemployedon average. LetTmax
be the maximum tax rate; let b be UI benefits atan annual rate, that is,
fifty-two times the weekly benefit; and let W be the taxablewage base.
Then the maximum unemployment rate consistent with balancing bene-
fits and taxes isImax = Thus, it is an interaction of the tax rates and
taxable wage base that helps determine the tightness ofexperience rat-
ing. Consider the case where annual wages always exceed thetax base.
Then a proportional increase in all tax rates8 and cut in thetax base by
the same proportion would leave incentives unchanged. Note thatthe
Pmaxwould be unaffected by these changes. The last dozenyears have
seen roughly these two countervailing changes.
The Effects of TEFRA
A provision of TEFRA that became effective in 1985 raised thegross
federal UI tax rate from 3.4 percent to 6.2 percent and thecreditable
portion of the federal unemployment tax from 2.7 percentto 5.4 percent.
For employers to receive the full credit for federal taxes paid,a state's
maximum tax rate had to be at least 5.4 percent. Inresponse, many
states followed by raising their maximum UI tax rates. As reported in the
first two lines of Table 1, states sharply increased their maximumtax rate
and their range of rates between 1982 and 1985. The resultwas a big
jump up in the maximum unemployment rate consistent with balancing
taxes and benefits, as seen in the fourth row of the table. By thismea-
sure, then, TEFRA succeeded in tightening experience rating. While the
higher maximum rates and larger ranges of rateswere mostly still in
place in 1992, the tighter experience rating created by the changesof
TEFRA has been largely eroded by a taxablewage base that has declined
in real terms. The federal UI taxable wage base, whichwas originally the
same as the Social Security wage base, has only been raised irregularly
since 1935. While the Social Security tax base is $55,500 for 1992, theUI
tax base is only $7,000. While states can determine theirown tax base for
the state part of the UI tax, and sixteen statesnow index their tax bases,
most still follow the federal pattern. UI benefits, however, havegener-
ally kept pace with inflation. These trendscan be seen clearly in the 17-
percent decrease in the ratio of the taxable wage base to theaverage UI
In reserve ratio states, this statement requires a proportional increase in alltax rates for a
given difference between past benefits and taxes (the numerator of thereserve ratio),
because the denominator of the reserve ratio depends on the taxablewage base.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax117
TABLE 1.
Summary Measures of State Experience Rating for SelectedYears.
Sources: Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, NationalFoundation for Unemploy-
ment Compensation & Workers' Compensation, various years; and ETHandbook 394 and Supple-
ments, U.S. Department of Labor.
Notes: The numbers are employment weighted averages of the numbers forthe individual states.
Average benefits are 52 times average weekly benefits. The maximumunemployment rate consistent
with equal benefits and taxes is the product of the maximum tax rate and the ratio ofthe taxable wage
base to average benefits. The 1992 average benefit numbers are extrapolated usingthe 1985-1990 trend.
See the text for further explanation.
benefit between 1985 and 1992, reported in the thirdline of Table 1.
Becausemax this decline inhas resulted in the maximum unem-
ployment rate consistent with a balancing of benefitsand taxes falling
dramatically since 1985. Thus, most of the strengthening of experience
rating under TEFRA has been eroded in recent yearsbecause of a federal
taxable wage base that has been fixed in nominal termsand, thus, fallen
in real terms since 1983, while real benefits haveremained approxi-
mately constant.
II. INDUSTRY LEVEL EVIDENCE ONPERSISTENT
CROSS-SUBSIDIES
To establish the extent of interindustry subsidies, we examine alarge num-
ber of states over as long as twelve years. It is important toexamine a large
number of states given their diversity of experience rating systemsand in-
dustrial bases. We also examine as long a period aspossible to determine
subsidies that are persistent, rather than because of asingle transitory
downturn. In order to do this, we wrote to each of thefifty states, request-
ing data on taxes collected and benefits paid since 1980by industry. About
1982198519901992
Average of all 50 states
Maximum tax rate 5.207.046.636.75
Rangeof rates 4.266.056.166.16
Ratio of taxable wage base to average benefits 1.111.211.071.01
Maximum unemployment rate consistent with
equal benefits and taxes
5.628.467.096.75
Average of 22 states with industry data
Maximum tax rate 5.027.316.786.93
Range of rates 4.086.286.336.38
Ratio of taxable wage base to average benefits 1.091.171.050.99
Maximum unemployment rate consistent with
equal benefits and taxes
5.428.547.146.88118Anderson and Meyer
half of the states supplied some data, with slightly fewer providing data in
a usable form. Thus, the bottom half of Table 1 reports information for
twenty-two states that have a variety of experience rating systems and
industry distributions, and account for just over 55 percent of total UI-
covered employment for the United States. The summarymeasures indi-
cate that our twenty-two states follow the same time pattern as the other
states and have slightly higher taxes and tighter experience rating.
Table 2 gives our main summary statistics for the twenty-two states.
For each of eight industries, we report two numbers: the ratio of benefits
received to taxes paid and the average annual subsidy to the industry (in
millions of dollars) caused by incomplete experience rating. A number
greater than one for the benefit/tax ratio indicates the industry receiveda
subsidy, and below it will be a positive number for theaverage annual
subsidy. A number less than one for the benefit/tax ratio indicates that
the firm was a subsidizer, so that the subsidy number below is negative.
For each state we also indicate the years of data we have available,
where the average number of years is 10.8, and the minimum is eight.
The industry benefit/tax ratio we report is the relative benefit/tax ratio
defined as, where B. is UI benefits received by employees in industry i
over the period, and 7 is taxes paid by firms in industry i, and R is1B1/
1T1. We have divided by R, the overall state ratio of benefits to taxes,
because this ratio often deviates from one over long periods of time.9 We
calculate the average annual subsidy to the industry as B.- TR. This
subsidy measure accounts for the overall state fund balance by allocating
any excess or deficit of taxes over benefits to the industries in proportion
to the amount paid in, before calculating the difference between taxes
and benefits for each industry. The resulting number, then, represents
the interindustry subsidy that would result if the state collected exactly
the same amount in taxes as it paid in benefits over the time period, but
if at the same time there was no change in the relative tax structure.
In Table 2, there is a striking tendency of the same industries in
different states to receive subsidies. In all twenty-two states, construc-
tion receives a positive subsidy, and in all but Connecticut, Minne-
sota, and Vermont, manufacturing also receives one. Agriculture and
mining also receive generally positive subsidies. At the other extreme,
trade and also finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) always receive
negative subsidies, that is, they are always subsidizers. In all but New
York,transportation and communication subsidizes other indus-
There are a number of reasons for long-term differences between benefits and taxes. In
some cases we have only charged benefits, which are often much less than total benefits.
In addition, state fund balances also go through long-term swings as benefit and tax
schedules and unemployment change.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax119
tries,10 while services has a negative subsidy in twenty of twenty-two
states. The benefit/tax ratio in construction varies from 1.14 inTennessee
to over 2.0 in Connecticut and Ohio. Whileagriculture usually receives a
modest subsidy, in California the benefit/tax ratio is over 2.0.
In addition to pointing out the predictability of theinterindustry subsi-
dies, Table 2 also shows that the magnitudes of thesesubsidies are no
small matter. Even in a very small state such as Maine, $6.1million is
transferred annually to manufacturing, and another $4.1 million is re-
ceived by construction, with $5.1 million coming from trade, $2.6million
from services, and $2.0 million from FIRE. In Minnesota, the average
annual subsidy to construction is $43.5 million, and in themuch larger
state of Pennsylvania, the subsidy to construction is over$100 million,
with the loss to trade being almost $80 million. The largestsubsidy in the
table is a $112.8 million annual subsidy to agriculture inCalifornia.
Table 3 reports several summary measures for our twenty-two states
as well as estimated U.S. totalsand benefit/tax ratios from thirty years
ago. The first line of the table reportsthe average of the benefit/tax
ratios, which vary from 1.66 in construction to 0.56 in FIRE.Note that
these numbers imply that construction receives abouttwo-thirds more in
benefits than it pays in taxes, while FIRE receives about half ofwhat it
pays in. For our twenty-two statestogether, the total subsidy to construc-
tion is over $650 million annually, and the subsidy tomanufacturing is
almost $290 million. Trade and services are the largestlosers in these
cross-subsidies, transferring a combined $900 million annually to other
industries. If we inflate these numbers by the ratio of totalU.S. covered
employment to that in our twenty-two states, our results suggestthat
nationally almost $1.2 billion are transferred to construction,while trade
and services pay nearly $1.6 billion more than they receive.These esti-
mated U.S. totals are reported in the third line of Table 3and should be
treated as rough estimates, because states differ along many dimensions
that could make this extrapolation inaccurate.
The fourth line of Table 3 reports the industry benefit/tax ratiosfor the
years beginning with 1985, thefirst year of the TEFRA provisions. While
the cross-subsidies are clearly smaller than they are duringthe full period,
they are only slightly smaller. A decrease wouldhave been expected
anyway, because the interindustry subsidiestend to fall in expansionary
periods.11 It is not surprising that the legislation did not appreciably re-
10Even the New York numbers would indicate that transportation andcommunication
subsidized other industries were it not for the over $80 million in benefits paid because of a
1989 NYNEX strike.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax223
duce the subsidies, because the effects of the changes werequickly eroded
away, as discussed earlier.
These results are very much in accord with pastresearch on the subject
by Becker (1972), which uses data from the 1950s and1960s, and by Munts
and Asher (1981), which uses data from the 1970s. Thestatistics presented
in the latter are not strictly comparable to those inTables 2 and 3, but the
authors conclude that construction, manufacturing,and agriculture are
most likely to receive subsidies, and that tradeand FIRE are most likely to
be subsidizers. Becker (1972) provides informationthat is detailed enough
to allow us to construct relative benefit/taxratios by industry in the same
manner as Table 2.12 We calculatethese statistics for the six states that are
also available in our new data (California, NewYork, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Utah) and directly compare the two.While separated
by over two decades, the ratios are remarkably similar,with a correlation
of 0.83 for the forty-two state-industry observations.We can similarly
compare an industry average acrossall ten states in Becker's data with an
industry average for all twenty-two of our states.These numbers for the
period 1957-1967 are reported in the last line of Table 3.The correlation of
these averages for the seven industries is 0.99. Thus,taken together with
these past studies, Tables 2 and 3 imply a striking patternof interindustry
subsidies that has persisted for well over thirty years.
III. CAUSES OF PERSISTENT SUBSIDIESFROM THE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
The previous section documented the existenceof persistent subsidies
resulting from the UI financing system. Given thatthe interindustry
subsidies range in the hundreds of millions of dollars,it is important
that we understand their causes. In order to focus onthe source of these
subsidies, we can decompose the benefit/tax ratio intoseveral key parts.
To this consider that this ratio can be expressed as
B/TI(n1d1b1)/(t1w1)
R (ndb)/(tw) (1)
Here n is the total number of UI claims inindustry i, d. is the duration of
these claims, and b1 is the average weeklybenefit amount, so that the
product of these three terms is total industry benefits.Similarly, t is the
average tax rate and w, is totaltaxable wages in the industry, which
12See Becker (1972), pp. 336-337.124Anderson and Meyer
together determine total UI taxes paid. The unsubscripted variablesare
the equivalent state level variables. Equation (1)can be then rewritten to
express the benefit/tax ratio as the product of five ratios:
B/TI
Rn)d)b)tJw.) (2)
Decomposing the benefit/tax ratio in thisway allows for a simple inter-
pretation of the relative contribution of UI incidence, duration, benefit
levels, tax rates, and taxable wages to the overall subsidy. Ifa given ratio
is greater than one, then it is a source of higher subsidies, while ifthe
ratio is less than one, the opposite is true.
While the interpretation of such a decomposition is thus quitestraight-
forward, the data used in Tables 2 and 3, though, like thoseof the
previous studies, do not have the level of detailnecessary to perform
this decomposition. Data from eight states thatwere part of the Continu-
ous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) project, however, do provide
this information. 13 The data consist of UI administrativewage and bene-
fit records for a sample of between 5 and 20 percent of thestates' covered
workers. We have taken a sample of approximately 150,000wage rec-
ords from each state, and matched them with the benefit records bythe
quarter in which the UI was initiated. Because thewage records contain
information on both wages and tax rates, we can compute total UItaxes
paid and compare this to benefits received. Additionally, bynoting
when the firm identifier given on the employeewage record changes,
we can identify permanent and temporary separations.'4
For each industry in each state and for the state overall,we calculate
the average incidence, duration, benefits, tax rate, and taxablewages
over all the firms. The ratio of industry to state then gives us thesources
of the benefit/tax ratio. Each ratio can be thought ofas representing the
value for an average firm in the industry, standardized by the valuefor
an average firm in the state overall. Additionally, we further subdivide
incidence, characterizing claims as arising from eitherpermanent layoffs
or from temporary layoffs.15
'See Anderson and Meyer (1993) for a fuller description of this data set.
14 In the final data set, the years 1978-1983are available for Georgia, 1978-1982 for Mis-
souri, 1980-1983 for Washington, 1979-1981 for Idaho, and 1981-1983 for Louisiana,New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
15 Note that the benefit/tax ratio calculated from thecomponents for this representative firm
will not be identical to the ratio for the industry as a whole, but rather isan approximation of
that ratio. However, there is a very high correlation of 0.97 between the twomeasures.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax125
In Table 4, we summarize the results of thedecomposition. The num-
bers in columns [1] to [5] correspond to the five componentratios given
in equation (2). The component ratios werecalculated separately for
each state, and the table presents the average for thatindustry across the
eight states. Recall that a number less than 1 indicatesthat the compo-
nent is responsible for decreasing thebenefit/tax ratio, while a number
greater than 1 indicates that the component isresponsible for increasing
the benefit/tax ratio. Thus, while the interpretationof the benefit/tax
ratio given in column [6] is analogous to those givenin Tables 2 and 3,
here it is calculated simply as the product ofcolumns [1] through [5}.16
Columns [7] and [8], which decompose incidence into permanentand
temporary layoffs, are calculated in a similar manner tocolumn [1]; thus,
they are state-industry averages divided by the state average,which are
then averaged over all eight states.
First note that as was true in Tables 2 and 3, construction,manufactur-
ing, and mining are being subsidized, andFIRE, trade, services, and
transportation and communication are subsidizers. Unlike inthose ta-
bles, though, in Table 4, agriculture appears as arelative subsidizer.
However, there are only a small number of observationsfor this industry
in the CWBH data, making it somewhat lessreliable. Several patterns in
the sources of the cross-subsidies are evidentfrom Table 4. First, it is
clear that the major determinant of an above averagesubsidy is an above
average rate of UI-compensatedlayoffs. The largest (and smallest) num-
bers in the table appear in columns [1], [7], and [8].Especially important
to manufacturing, and to a lesser extent tomining and construction, is
the above-average incidence of UI-compensatedspells that end in recall.
This temporary incidence is almost three timesthat of the average, and
close to ten times that for an industry such as retailtrade where tempo-
rary layoffs are wellbelow average. While the largest variance across
industries is found in column [8], that of column [7] isalso very large.
Thus, while high rates of temporary layoffs are a leading causeof net
positive subsidies, above-average rates of permanent layoffsresulting in
UI are also to blame, especially in construction.In fact, manufacturing
and construction produce this type of UI spell one and a quarterto two
times as often as the average.
In manufacturing, the higher overall incidence of UI isaccompanied
by spells of shorter duration, which work to slightlydecrease the sub-
16Note that column [6] is not the actual average over all eight states,but again represents
an approximation based on the experienceof an "average" firm from those states. The two


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax127
sidy. This is not the case for constructionand mining, though, where
both duration and incidence contributepositively to the subsidy. The
exact opposite is true in agriculture, whereboth duration and incidence
contribute negatively to the subsidy. For all the remainingindustries, a
lower incidence of UI is somewhat offset bylonger durations. In general,
though, there is not as much variation across industries inthe effects of
duration as there is in those of incidence.
In column [5] we see that there is quite a bitof variation in the effect of
the taxable wage base. Thus, for example,the high incidence of benefits
in manufacturing is somewhat mitigatedby a high taxable wage base,
thereby decreasing the overall subsidy. This is not the casefor construc-
tion, however, where the taxable wage base isbelow average, leading to
an increase in the subsidy.Construction is also unique in that this lower
taxable wage base does not then result inbelow average benefit levels,
but rather both the taxable wage base and thebenefit level (column [3])
contribute to above average benefit/tax ratios. In theother industries,
there is a weak tendency for above-averagebenefits, and taxable wage
bases go hand in hand, each partially offsettingthe effect of the other on
the total benefit/tax ratio.
The main reason taxable wages and benefitlevels are not perfectly
correlated is that the taxable wage base and the wagebase used for
determining benefit levels are calculated differently.The weekly benefit
level is generally determined as a percentageof high quarter earnings
(subject to a maximum), while the taxable wagebase is the first X dollars
from the employer in a given year, where X isusually around $6,000 or
$7,000. It is easy to see why a highly variableindustry such as construc-
tion would be particularly helped by this system.For example, in Geor-
gia in 1980, to qualify for UI, a workerneeded to earn 1.5 times the high
quarter earnings in the base period. The maximumweekly benefit of $90
would then be received by anyone with high quarterearnings of $2,225
or more. In a stable industry, wewould expect base period earnings to
be close to four times the high quarter earnings,implying that in qualify-
ing for the maximum weekly benefit, theworker most likely reached the
maximum taxable wage base of $6,000. For aconstruction worker, how-
ever, the high quarter earnings arelikely to be very much higher than
earnings in other quarters when work is slack.It would be possible,
then, to receive the maximum weekly benefit,while having a taxable
wage base that is as low as$3,338. While it is likely that base period
earnings are in fact more than the minimum of 1.5times the high quarter
earnings, it is clear that they can be considerablybelow average without
a corresponding decrease inweekly benefits.128Anderson and Meyer
Column [4] shows the effect of the tax rate component. The fact that
there is not much variation in this effect, given the variation ininci-
dence, points to a key determinant of the persistent subsidization. While
the effect of incidence is highly positively correlated with theoverall
subsidy, the opposite is true for the effect of tax rates. This is dueto the
design of state experience rating systems, whereby taxrates are higher
for firms with more use of the UI system. As Table 4 makes clear,
though, the increases in tax rates are not nearly sufficientto offset the
effects of increased UI receipt. Thus, the failure of thetax rates to rise
along with UI incidence leads to a persistent pattern of subsidization.In
insurance terms, the premiums paid by firms do not accurately reflect
the risk of loss.
An examination of the state level data on thesources of the cross-
subsidies confirms the averages of Table 4. For the seventy-twostate-
industry cells (eight states times nine industries),we calculate covariances
of the benefit/tax ratio with the source ratios given in equation (2),as well
as the components representing the two types of layoffs. All of the covari-
ances except that with the taxable wage base are significantly different
from zero. As expected, the layoff variables have by far the highestcovari-
ances with the benefit/tax ratio, 0.43 for temporary layoffs and 0.22 for
permanent layoffs (0.36 for overall incidence). All other covariances have
the expected signs, but are less than 0.04. In general, then, theseresults
indicate that the averages of Table 4 capture the main relationships in the
data.
Overall, the results of the decomposition show that highrates of tem-
porary layoffs for certain industries are the main reason for persistent
interindustry subsidies. The relative importance of temporary layoffs
compared to permanent layoffs further indicates that cross-subsidiesare
due not so much to permanent shocks to certain firms inan industry,
but rather more to temporary or seasonal changes that leadto short-term
employment adjustment. This is an important point, because the insur-
ance value to firms of imperfect experience rating is dependent upon the
unpredictability of UI payments. One can also conclude thata key rea-
son for the persistent subsidies is that tax rates do not vary sufficiently to
compensate for the differences in layoffs. While imperfect experience
rating is a major cause of subsidization, the results also imply that the
divergence between the wages on which benefitsare based and taxable
wages is a significant contributor. Higher benefits and higher taxable
wages do not always go hand in hand, because benefit levels are not
based on taxable wages, but rather on high quarterwages, and are
subject to maxima and minima.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax129
IV. FIRM LEVEL EVIDENCE ON PERSISTENT
SUBSIDIES
Past work on UI subsidies, such as that by Becker (1972) and Muntsand
Asher (1981), focused on broad industry groups, because taxes paid and
benefits received by laid-off employees were not available at the firm
level.'7 However, the firm is the appropriate unit to analyze because
experience rating is done at the firm level. In this section, we once again
make use of the newly available CWBH data set that provides just this
information, to investigate the persistence of firm-level subsidies. Our
data on firm-level subsidies come from the administrative recordsof two
of the states that participated in the CWBH project. For both Georgia and
Washington, we have the UI wage and benefit records for a 10 percent
sample of the state's covered workers, and those data cover aperiod
greater than three years. For Georgia the years 1978-1983 areavailable,
while for Washington the time period covered is 1980-1983. In order to
be reasonably certain that this 10 percent sample would accuratelyreflect
a firm's UI experience, we limit our data set torecords from those firms
that had over 1,000 employees at least some time during theperiod
covered by our data. Nonetheless, there is likely to be a gooddeal of
measurement error in our data on firm-level benefit payments.
While Georgia and Washington were chosen mainly because theyaf-
forded the longest time spans to examine, they also allow us to contrast
two vastly different experience rating systems. InWashington, a truly
experience-rated tax schedule only goes into effect if the overall state
balances exceed a certain level. Because this was never the case during the
time period we examine, all firms were assessed a flat-rate taxof 3 percent.
By contrast, in Georgia there are forty-three different tax rates, ranging
from 0.07 percent to 5.71 percent in the years 1979-1981, and from 0.06
percent to 5.38 percent in the remaining years. In ourdata, only 0.3
percent of the firm year observations are at the minimum tax rate,and 2.3
percent are at the maximum. Thus, most of the firmsin Georgia face a
sloped tax schedule. For all but a few rates, this slope is about 0.44 for the
1979-1981 period, and 0.41 for the other years. These are relatively steep
slopes not only in comparison to the zero slope of Washington, but also in
comparison to other states with more traditional schedules. Anderson
and Meyer (1992) show that in 1981, 93 percent of Georgiaemployment
was at firms who could expect to payback over $0.80 in higher future
Marks (1984) approaches the problem at the firm level, but he only looks at persistence
in tax rates.130Anderson and Meyer
taxes for each dollar in benefits received. The next closest state was Louisi-
ana, with only 58 percent of employment at such firms. One should note
that these measures of the tightness of experience rating partly dependon
the types of firms in a state and their behavior. However,our measure of
experience rating in section 1, the maximum unemployment rate consis-
tent with paying some cost of additional layoffs, is also considerably
above average for Georgia during this period. Thus,a comparison be-
tween Georgia and Washington is also a comparison between a state with
very tight experience rating and one with effectively no experience rating.
We can use the sample of CWBH data discussed in the previoussec-
tion to compare these large firms with firms in the state overall. While
the general patterns of the industry distribution are fairly similaracross
the two samples, manufacturing is overrepresented in this large firm
sample, as is transportation and communication, with most other indus-
tries underrepresented. Construction stands out especially in thisre-
gard.18 Based on the state sample, the large firms that weuse in our
sample account for approximately a quarter of total employment in each
state. In Georgia, these firms receive 32 percent of the UI benefits, while
in Washington, they receive only 21 percent.
For each firm year, we calculate the total amount of UI taxes (state and
federal) a firm pays, based on our sample of wage records. We then
match any UI benefits received by these workers to the firm employing
the worker in the quarter that the benefits were initiated. This allowsus
to calculate total benefits initiated by the firm's actions for the year and
to compare them with total taxes paid. As with the industry group data,
in order to account for the effects of the business cycle, we standardize
the benefit/tax ratio for each firm by dividing by the overall state benefit!
tax ratio for that year. 19 Comparing this relative benefit/tax ratioacross
years then allows us to determine if the same firms are consistently
subsidized (or subsidizing) over time. Recall that the argument for UIas
firm insurance would imply that large benefit outlays are unpredictable,
and, hence, the redistribution implied by insurance principles only
would result in no consistent patterns.
Table 5 provides a first indication that, in fact, the redistribution
caused by the UI payroll tax may significantly depart from thepure
insurance model. Note first that a significant number of firms are either
not subsidized at all or are subsidized in almost every year. For example,
18 About 45% of the Georgia firm sample is in manufacturing compared with28% for the
state sample, while for Washington the comparison is 34-20%. For both states, only 2%are
in construction compared with 7% in the state sample.
19 These yearly ratios were obtained from the sample of CWBH datadiscussed in the
previous section.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax131
TABLE 5.
Distribution of Firms, Employment, and UI Benefits by Number of Years
Subsidized.
Subsidized is defined as (UI benefits/UI taxes)5,/(UI benefits/UI taxes)te for the year being greater
than 1.
in Georgia 45 percent of the firms are subsidized at most one of the six
years, with another 7 percent always subsidized. InWashington, the
patterns are much stronger, with 65 percent of the firms never being
subsidized and another 13 percent always being subsidized, so that over
three-quarters of the firms are at the extremes. Table 5 also presents the
percentage of total employment and total UI benefits represented by
firms in each category. In both states, over one-third of UI benefits are
received by employees at firms that are subsidized in all, or in all but
one, of the years. At the same time, though, thesefirms account for only
a small fraction of employment. In fact, inWashington they account for
just 12 percent of employment, while receiving 43 percent of benefits.
Similarly in Georgia, 9 percent of the employment receives 36 percent of
the benefits. Thus, a clear pattern of redistribution is emerging.
Table 6 provides a quick summary of the persistence of subsidies from
year to year. The top row of each panel gives the probability that a firm
will receive a subsidy in later years, given that it does now. Similarly, the
second row of each panel gives the probability that a firm will subsidize
other firms in later years, given that it does now. The numbers indicate
that there is some tendency for firms to continue over time in their








0 52 24.88 34.71 6.21
1 43 20.57 19.97 8.85
2 35 16.75 13.88 12.68
3 27 12.92 11.34 14.07
4 26 12.44 11.19 22.15
5 12 5.74 4.92 21.58
6 14 6.70 3.98 14.47
Washington
0 113 64.94 59.63 18.90
1 19 10.92 25.72 26.32
2 7 4.02 3.16 11.57
3 13 7.47 4.69 10.55
4 22 12.64 6.81 32.67132Anderson and Meyer
TABLE 6.
Conditional Probability of a Firm Being Observed in Later Years with
Same Subsidy Status as in Current Year.*
(417) (137)
Note: Row counts in parentheses
Subsidy status is determined by (UI benefits/UI taxes)5 j(UI benefits/UI taxes)te for the year being
greater than 1 (receiving subsidy) or less than 1 (not receiving subsidy).
receiving subsidies and for firms in Washington. A useful way to summa-
rize this persistence is to calculate the probability of receiving a subsidy
for firms that received one in the past minus the probability of receiving
one for those that did not in the past. With no persistence, these differ-
ences in probabilities would be zero. For Georgia, this difference in
probabilities is 0.42, 0.23, and 0.22 after one, three, and five years,
respectively. For Washington, the comparison is more striking, with the
difference in probabilities being 0.70 and 0.59 after one and three years,
respectively. Thus, knowing a firm's subsidy status today is a very good
predictor of its subsidy status in the future.
To help in understanding this persistence more fully, the transition
matrices in Tables 7 and 8 provide a more detailed picture of the patterns
of redistribution effected by the UI payroll tax in Georgia and Washing-
ton. In these tables, firms are classified according to whether their
benefit/tax ratio is 0-0.5 (very small), 0.5-1 (small), 1-2 (large), or over 2
(very large). Given that a firm is currently in a certain class, the matrices
give the probabilities that the firm will be in each of the classes in later
years. The probability of remaining in the same class is thus reported by
the diagonal elements..2° If one turns first to the results for Georgia in
20 Note that the conditional probabilities presented in Table 6 are equivalent to the diago-
nals of a transition matrix of this sort where there are only two classes: 0-1 (no subsidy)
and over 1 (receives subsidy).
Probability still receiving!
not receiving subsidy
1 year later3 years later5 years later
Georgia
Receiving subsidy in year 1 0.63 0.53 0.49
(399) (216) (67)
Not receiving subsidy in year 1 0.79 0.70 0.73
(743) (441) (142)
Washington
Receiving subsidy in year 1 0.77 0.68
(127) (38)
Not receiving subsidy in year 1 0.93 0.91Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax133
TABLE 7.
1-, 3-, and 5-Year Transition Matrices for Georgia Firms.
Benefit/tax ratio 1 year later
0-0.5 0.5-1 1-2 Over2
0 to 0.5 0.62 0.24 0.09 0.06
(287) (109) (40) (26)
Benefit/tax 0.5 to 1 0.32 0.36 0.21 0.12
ratio (89) (100) (58) (34)
inyearl lto2 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.28
(38) (47) (63) (57)
Over 2 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.43
(26) (38) (47) (83)
Benefit/tax ratio 3 years later
0-0.5 0.5-1 1-2 Over 2
0 to 0.5 0.53 0.21 0.13 0.13
(149) (59) (36) (36)
Benefit/tax 0.5 to 1 0.26 0.37 0.19 0.18
ratio (42) (59) (31) (29)
in year 1 Ito 2 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28
(26) (34) (26) (34)
Over2 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.28
(19) (23) (27) (27)
Benefit/tax ratio 5 years later
0-0.5 0.5-1 1-2 Over 2
0 to 0.5 0.44 0.28 0.19 0.09
(43) (27) (18) (9)
Benefit/tax 0.5 to 1 0.31 0.42 0.18 0.09
ratio (14) (19) (8) (4)
in year 1 ito 2 0.39 0.22 0.15 0.24
(16) (9) (6) (10)
Over 2 0.08 0.27 0.23 0.42
(2) (7) (6) (11)
Note: Row probabilities may not add to 1 because of rounding; cell counts inparentheses; benefitltax
ratio is defined as (UI benefits/UI taxes)5/(UI benefits/UI taxes)for the year.
Table 7, there is substantial evidence for persistence of extremebenefit/
tax ratios. The probability that a firm with abenefit/tax ratio over 2 will
receive a subsidy five years later is 0.67, while for a firmthat previously
had a benefit/tax ratio below 0.5, the probability of receiving asubsidy
five years later is only 0.28. A stronger degree of persistenceof very
large benefit/tax ratios is observed in Table 8 for Washington,where the134Anderson and Meyer
TABLE 8.
1- and 3-Year Transition Matrices for Washington Firms.
(3) (1) (4) (11)
Note: Row probabilities may not add to I because of rounding; cell counts in parentheses; benefit/tax
ratio is defined as (UI benefits/UI taxes)5/(UI benefits/UI taxes)state for the year.
probability that a firm with a benefit/tax ratio over 2 will obtaina ratio
over 2 again one year later is 0.68, and it is 0.58 for three years later.
Here, the probability that a firm with a benefit/tax ratioover 2 will
receive a subsidy three years later is 0.79, while for a firm that previously
had a benefit/tax ratio below 0.5, this same probability is only 0.08.
If one looks at those firms with very small benefit/tax ratios in Wash-
ington, the persistence is just as striking as it is for those withvery large
ratios. The probability that a firm with a benefit/tax ratio under 0.5 will
obtain a ratio under 0.5 again one year later is 0.83, while it is 0.82 for
three years later. By contrast, for Georgia the probabilitiesare 0.62 for
one year, 0.53 for three years, and 0.44 for five years. As large as some of
these probabilities are, it is important to note that thepresence of mea-
surement error will cause us to understate the persistence in the benefit/
tax ratios. This is due to the fact that random errors thatcause the
computed benefit/tax ratio to fluctuate around its true mean will leadto
the erroneous appearance of changes in the ratio.
Benefit/tax ratio 1 year later
Over 2 0-0.5 0.5-1 1-2
0 to 0.5 0.83 0.13 0.03 0.01
(280) (44) (9) (5)
Benefit/tax 0.5 to 1 0.44 0.35 0.11 0.09
ratio (35) (28) (9) (7)
in year 1 ito 2 0.10 0.20 0.42 0.27
(6) (11) (23) (15)
Over 2 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.68
(8) (4) (11) (49)
Benefit/tax ratio 3 years later
0-0.5 0.5-i i-2 Over 2
0 to 0.5 0.82 0.11 0.05 0.03
(97) (13) (6) (3)
Benefit/tax 0.5 to 1 0.50 0.33 0.11 0.06
ratio (9) (6) (2) (1)
in year 1 ito 2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.37
(4) (4) (4) (7)
Over 2 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.58Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax135
Firm and Industry Components of the Benefit/Tax Ratio
Past work on benefit tax/ratios makes comparisons across industries but
ignores any variation across firms, within industry. The last findings
show that there are persistent interfirm subsidies, but they do not indi-
cate if the subsidies could be predicted based on the industries inwhich
the firms are located, or if other firm characteristics are responsible. It is
thus informative to explore what fraction of the variance in benefit/tax
ratios is industry-specific, what fraction is firm-specific, and what cannot
be attributed to firm or industry. In order to explore this question, we
write the benefit/tax ratio for firm j in industry i in year t as
RI)t = a1 + f3 + 'y1 +ijt' (3)
where a1 captures changes from year to year in the benefit/tax ratio, pi
captures differences between industries, y captures differences between
firms within an industry, andcaptures the variation over time for a
given firm.
There are several ways to estimate the relative contribution of indus-
try, firm, and other factors to the variance of the benefit/tax ratio. There
is no unique decomposition of the variance of R11. Using thefirm-level
benefit/tax ratio (adjusted for the state average) as the dependent vari-
able, we estimate equation (3) on the Georgia and Washington data. We
use year, industry class, and firm dummyvariables for the a's, /3's, and
y's. The change in the adjusted R2 provides a simple summary measure
of the fraction of the variance in R111 explained by the different factors. In
Georgia, industry dummy variables add an additional 7 percent to the
variance explained by year only, firm dummy variables add an addi-
tional 11 percent, and 82 percent of the variance is left unexplained. In
Washington, industry dummy variables add an additional 28 percent to
the variance explained, while firm dummies add an additional 32 per-
cent, leaving 40 percent unexplained.21 When two-digit industry group
rather than major industry class is used, the inclusion of firm dummy
variables still results in a large increase in adjusted R2. In Georgia, two-
digit industry explains 11 percent of the variance, with firm explaining
an additional 7 percent. For Washington,38 percent of the variance is
explained by two-digit industry, and firm explains another 22 percent.
Thus, by this simple measure, across-firm differences are important,
even within two-digit industry groups.
21 Year dummies essentially explain none of the variance. This finding is expected, because
standardizing by the state ratio should remove the effects of the business cycle.136Anderson and Meyer
A second way of decomposing the variance inis to directly estimate
the variance of the different components ofin equation (3). Again,
netting out the time period dummies, the ar's, we can write the variance
ofas
Var[R11Ia] = cr + cr, + cr, (4)
where cr, o, and o-are the variances of f3. y, and , respectively.
There are several standard ways to estimate the o's in the previous
equation, with no single preferred methods, so we try two.
There are several conclusions from this exercise that agree quite
closely with the results from the comparison of adjusted R2's earlier. The
estimated variances, o and o, are about equal, indicating that there is
about the same amount of variance within industries as there is between
industries. As before, this comparison still holds when one looks at two-
digit industries rather than industry divisions.23 It is also clear that a
relatively large fraction of the variance remains unexplained, especially
in Georgia. In Washington, though, this residual variance is slightly
smaller than the fraction explained by industry and firm. A large part of
this unexplained variance, however, is likely due to measurement error,
because our benefit/tax ratios are based on a 1/10 sample of employees.
We should note that part of the variance that we attribute to firms might
be accounted for if we used still narrower industry groups. Nonetheless,
the evidence does suggest that the variance across firms (within indus-
try) is as great as that across industry and, hence, that a substantial
source of cross-subsidization is ignored in work done at the industry
level.
This key finding that there is a considerable amount of persistence in
interfirm subsidies, which are not explained by industry alone, has sev-
eral implications. First, given the magnitude of the interindustry subsi-
dies, this indication that they are only half of the story implies that the
cross-subsidy problem is likely to be much greater than past evidence at
the broad industry level has suggested. Second, the key argument
against more complete experience rating revolves around the idea of
insuring the firm against losses from a large benefit payout. As with any
We estimate the a's using the method of maximum likelihood, and the MIVQUEO
method developed by Hartley, Rao, and LaMotte (1978).
In fact, the fraction of the variance in the benefit/tax ratio attributed to firms rather
than industries often rises when one examines 2-digit industries. This surprising result
occurs because the estimates of the industry variance are fairly imprecise when one
examines industry divisions because one is essentially estimating a variance using only a
few observations.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax137
insurance plan, patterns of interfirm subsidies are expected at a pointin
time. However, to the extent that these patterns are predictable year
after year, the insurance value of the subsidies is lessened. Our findings,
then, suggest that the loss in insurance value from tightened experience
rating is likely to be smaller than previously thought.
5. EFFICIENCY LOSSES FROM CROSS-SUBSIDIES
Much of the past work on UI financing has focused on the distortionary
effect of imperfect experience rating on firm layoff decisions. For example,
Topel (1983) concludes that 30 percent of layoff unemployment may be
due to incomplete experience rating. We would expect imperfect experi-
ence rating to also affect the level of employmentat firms. Because most
firms' tax payments do not equal the UI costs of their layoffs, incomplete
experience rating increases the cost of labor of some firms and decreases it
for others. Subsidized firms will then increase their size at the expense of
firms paying more than their share in taxes. This section estimates the
efficiency loss from this distortion of labor costs. We find that these costs
are not especially large if the marginalsubsidy is not very different from
the average subsidy. However, there is little evidence to examine this
difference. If the relevant marginal subsidy is much higher, then the
welfare costs of the cross-subsidies could be substantial.
The societal losses stemming from the distortion of labor costs across
industries can be summarized by measures of deadweight loss (DWL).
Topel (1990) provides the only discussion we know of deadweight losses
from UI subsidies. Without actual data on benefits and tax payments,
however, Topel estimates the subsidy based only on average industry
unemployment. He estimates that the DWL caused by the subsidy to
construction alone is $300 million annually and that accounting for the
difference between marginal and average subsidies (a point discussed
later) could make the losses much larger. However, while we are inter-
ested in comparing the current UI system to a perfectly experience-rated
system, Topel compares the current system tothe situation of no unem-
ployment insurance. As a result, his measure of the UI employment
subsidy includes the effect of the nontaxation of UI benefits that was in
force prior to 1987.24 If one uses Topel's method for calculating theDWL,
but accounts for the taxation of benefits, the resulting DWL is $86million
rather than $300 million. This difference should be kept in mindwhen
one compares our results to thoseinTopel (1990).
24 His estimates also implicitly assume that UI benefits are valued dollar for dollar by
workers and the firm.138Anderson and Meyer
We begin by providing estimates of the efficiency loss assuming that
all firms in a given industry in all states have the same subsidy rate, and
that the marginal subsidy is the same as the average. If one defines Sas
the dollar subsidy to an industry over its total payroll, the deadweight
loss as a fraction of payroll for a given industry can be approximatedas
DWL = 0.5eS2 whereis the elasticity of labor demand for firms in that
industry.25 In Table 9, we present the average industry subsidies from
Table 3, both as a dollar value per employee and as a fraction of the total
industry payroll. We then estimate a dollar value for the deadweight loss
triangle, based on 1985 average industry payroll and a value of 1 for the
elasticity of labor demand.26 In general the absolute value of the subsi-
dies is relatively small when compared to industry employment and
payroll. Only in construction does the subsidy amount to even a full
percentage point of payroll, and for most other industries it is less than
half of 1 percent. Similarly, annual subsidies per employee are under
$100 for all but mining and construction. The overall deadweight loss
estimate of Table 9 is $10.24 million with $6.22 million of the total loss
coming from construction alone.27 However, as discussed further later,
there are several reasons why these estimates are likely to understate
severely the true efficiency losses.
One obvious problem with these estimates is that they reflect only the
loss from the labor misallocation across industries, while, as we have
shown earlier, the across-firm variation within industry is equally if not
more important. A simple example will serve to illustrate how important
this difference is. Imagine an industry made up of equal numbers of two
types of firms: one type always receives a 5 percent subsidy, and the
other always provides a 5 percent subsidy. While there will beno sub-
sidy calculated at the industry level (and, hence, no misallocation), there
is actually a deadweight loss equal to 0.125 percent of payroll at each and
To see this, consider that the welfare triangle over total payroll can be defined as DWL =
(0.5 4W4N)/WN, where W is the average wage, N is employment for a given industry, and
4 means the change in the variable following. Noting that s = (4N/N)/(4W/W) and S = 4W!
W leads to the expression given.
26Industry payroll figures are from the Monthly Labor Review. Hamermesh (1986) reviews
estimates of labor demand elasticities, finding that industry-level constant-output elas-
ticities range from 0.3 to 1.0, while allowing output to vary leads to estimates between 0.4
and 2.6. Because firm demand should be closer to the latter, we use 1.0 as an estimate of
the elasticity. Additionally, because the DWL is proportional to s, one can easily multiply
the given DWL by an alternate elasticity if desired.
27Given our $6 million number, one might wonder how Topel arrived at his $300 million
figure. We indicated that his figure would be $83 million now that benefits are taxable. He
also appears to have assumed values for the construction industry unemployment rate and
the maximum tax rate that are extreme and increase the subsidy. In addition, he appears to
have left out the 0.5 in the DWL formula earlier.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax139
TABLE 9.
Estimated Deadweight Loss from Labor Misallocation.
Note: Employment and Earnings numbers areannual averages for 1985 and are from Monthly Labor
Review (1986).
every firm (assuming e =1). We can use our firm-level data to estimate
how this across-firm misallocation comparesto that across industries.
Looking at our firms in Georgia, and summing taxes,benefits, and pay-
roll across all firms within an industry, weobtain average subsidies that
are very close to thosein Table 928 However, using the firm-levelinfor-
mation to calculate the deadweight loss ateach firm, and then summing
across all firms in eachindustry, results in a dollar value for the dead-
weight loss that is 4.56 times larger thanthe one calculated based on
industry averages.29 Thus, becausefirms within industries vary substan-
tially as to their subsidy status, lookingonly at the across industry
misallocation severely understates the extentof the efficiency losses.
A very similar source of understatementis our use of the average U.S.
subsidy rather than state-level subsidies. Just asrelying on total industry
subsidies rather than firm-level subsidies loses a sourceof variation, so
too does using a national average.Annual payroll is available at the state
level for manufacturing establishments,though, allowing us to gauge
the importance of this type of aggregation.When we calculate a separate
deadweight loss value for each of the twenty-twostates and then sum
them together, we estimate a loss that is1.66 times that obtained using
28 We use Georgia rather than Washington because its experience ratingsystem is more
representative of the United States.
29 The six-year average of taxes, benefits, and payroll areused for each firm. This measure
is likely to somewhat overstate the firm-levelDWL, since some of the firm variability will





Weeklytage of thesubsidy value
Employmentearningsannual per of dead-
(1000's) (dollars)wage billemployeeweight loss
Mining 930 520 0.60 162.73 455,468
Construction 4,687 464 1.05 253.10 6,220,557
Manufacturing19,314 386 0.13 27.04 351,773
Transportation 5,242 450 0.08 19.84 44,080
Trade 23,100 219 0.35 39.95 1,621,519
FIRE 5,953 289 0.40 60.00 713,000
Services 21,974 256 0.24 31.85 835,685
Total 10,242,082140Anderson and Meyer
the average subsidy over these states.3° Again,we appear to understate
the deadweight loss in Table 9.
A third problem is more difficult to summarize butno less important.
All of the previous discussions are basedon the assumption that the
average subsidy that we are able to calculate is identical to the marginal
subsidy that is appropriate for firm decisions. However,the marginal
subsidy may well be much greater than theaverage subsidy. Because the
deadweight loss increases with thesquare of the subsidy, this difference
could be very significant. For example, consider thecase of a seasonal
firm that lays off a fraction x of its workers for one-half ofthe year.31 For
the case of a 40 percent replacement rate (about theaverage), total UI
benefits are 40 percent"of the labor costs of themarginal seasonal em-
ployee's wage bill (this is calculatedas (0.4)(½)I(½)). Because the UI tax
is rarely more than 2 percent of averagewages, nearly all of this 40
percent would be a marginal subsidy to seasonal employment.For now,
then, we will ignore UI taxes completely. Bycontrast, the average sub-
sidy at this firm is (x(0.4)(½))/(x(½) + (1- x)).32 If seasonal workers are
one-tenth of employment (x = .1), for example, then themarginal sub-
sidy is 40 percent, while theaverage subsidy is 2.1 percent. Again,
because the DWL is proportional to thesquare of the subsidy, the differ-
ence between average and marginal can have a large impacton the
efficiency losses.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge overall how muchthe marginal
subsidy is likely to differ from theaverage. We might expect the diver-
gence to be especially large in seasoning industries suchas retail trade,
construction, and some types of services and manufacturing.This under-
statement will be more of a problem the smallerx is, because in general if
only a fraction x of the workforce is seasonal, themarginal subsidy will
be more than 1/x times greater than theaverage measured subsidy.33 It is
important to note, though, that the marginal subsidyshould probably
only apply to the fraction of the workforce that isseasonal. Overall,
though, this relationship is one morereason to believe that the small
° For our sample, the $290 million subsidyto manufacturing represents about 0.13 percent
of total payroll in those twenty-two states, and impliesa deadweight loss of about
$194,000. Note that the larger dollar value given in Table 9 reflectshaving inflated the
numbers for our twenty-two states to represent the United Statesas a whole. Using the
individual state subsidies results in a total deadweight loss of almost$322,000.
31This example is a slightly modified version ofone in Topel (1990). With a 40 percent
replacement rate, most states' potential duration rules would allowa person to receive UI
for just under one-half of the year. Thus, this example is closeto the extreme case.
32Note that if x = 1, this simplifies to the expression given earlier.
See the previous formula. For small x, the ratio is approximately2/x.Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax141
deadweight loss estimates of Table 9 are grossunderestimates of the true
loss, especially in some key industries.
To assess the overall effect of the previousthree adjustments to the
national industry level deadweight loss estimatesof Table 9, we must
combine the effects of the difference betweenfirm and industry, state
and nation, and marginal and average subsidies.The Georgia estimates
of the difference between firm and industrysubsidies suggested that the
firm DWL estimates are 4.56 times higher. Similarly,the manufacturing
industry data imply state subsidies 1.66 timeshigher than those using
the U.S. average. Combining these factorswith the subsidy estimates of
Table 9 yields a total U.S. deadweight loss estimateof $77.51 million
annually. While this is a substantial loss, it is fairlysmall relative to the
$20 billion annual cost of UI. We have verylittle basis to assess the
additional effect on the deadweight loss estimatesof the difference be-
tween marginal and average subsidies.We can, however, say that if the
marginal subsidies are z times higher than the averagesubsidies (but
apply to liz of the workforce), the impliedannual DWL is $z(77.51)
million. Because z could be fairly large, the truedeadweight loss caused
by incomplete experience rating couldbe substantial.34
Besides this deadweight loss from the misallocationof resources, there
are also losses fromincreased unemployment. This loss occurs because
the firms whose expansion is mostsubsidized are those for whom unem-
ployment is the highest, and marginal subsidies arethe greatest for
employees who are regularly unemployed. If one notesthat the percent-
age change in employmentimplied by a subsidy is simply S, it is
straightforward to calculate the change in employmentimplied by a
subsidy. For example, based on the information inTable 9, employment
in construction is 1.05 percent, or 49,000, greaterthan it would be in the
absence of a UI subsidy. If these 49,000 workershave the same average
unemployment rate as the industry overall,construction industry unem-
ployment would rise by 6,400. However, it isreasonable to assume that
the additional workers hired because of thesubsidy will experience
more unemployment thanthe average worker. In the most extreme
case, the additional workers areunemployed half the year. In this case
the increase in unemployment in constructionwould be about 24,500
To be consistent with the average subsidies we observe, amarginal subsidy higher than
the average must apply to only some fraction of employment.This assumes that all firms in
a subsidized industry receive subsidiesand that the same labor demand elasticity applies
to all sectors of all firms' employment. Forexample, if the marginal subsidy in an industry
is five times the average, then it could only apply to½ of the industry workforce. Thus, the
DWL in that industry would risd by a factor of 5 becausethe DWL per employee would rise
by the factor of 5 but only apply to1/of the industry employment.142Anderson and Meyer
workers. Some of this increase would be offset bya decline in unemploy-
ment in industries with decreases in employment, but this calculation
suggests there are moderate increases in unemployment caused by the
cross-subsidies.
Overall, it is clear that there are efficiency losses in thecurrent UI tax
system, which stem from the fact that there isa tax on employment at
relatively stable firms and a subsidy for relatively unstable firms.This
misallocation implies that aggregate output could be increasedby redi-
recting resources. Additionally, the subsidies leadto increased unem-
ployment rates, given the larger workforces at the less stablefirms. Al-
though it remains difficult to measure the exact size of theselosses even
with our new data, it is clear that looking only at nationalindustry level
cross-subsidization will lead to a severe underestimation of theloss.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present several key findingson the nature of the
interindustry and interfirm subsidies generated through theUI payroll
tax. We document that the same patterns of large interindustrysubsidies
have persisted for over thirty years, andwe find that these subsidies are
due mostly to differences in layoff ratesacross industries. It is especially
temporary layoff rates, combined with tax rates, that do not reflect these
differences in layoffs that are responsible. This importance oftemporary
layoffs (relative to permanent changes in employment) indicatesto a
large extent that the benefit payments are predictable. Thus,it is a find-
ing that weakens arguments for incomplete experience ratingas insur-
ance for firms against large layoff costs. While high temporary layoff
rates that are not matched by higher tax rates are the main contributorto
large interindustry subsidies, we also find that the divergencebetween
the levels of wages on which taxes and benefitsare calculated contrib-
utes to the subsidies, albeit to a lesser extent.
Our exploration of interfirm subsidies providesmore evidence on the
predictability of benefit payments. Using previouslyunexamined firm
level data, we document a persistent pattern of benefit/taxratios over
several years. We find that a firm currently receivinga subsidy from the
UI system is much more likely to be still receivinga subsidy three to five
years later than a firm that is not currently subsidized. This result im-
plies that to a significant degree, the interfirm subsidiesare regular
transfers, rather than insurance for firms, thus further weakeningthe
argument for incomplete experience rating. An additional finding ofour
work with firm level data is that much of the variationacross firms in UI
benefit receipt and tax payments is not captured by industry data.Thus,Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax143
past work performed at the industrylevel is likely to have revealed only
a fraction of thecross-subsidies carried out by the UI payroll tax.
The interindustry and interfirm subsidies that wedocument will have
real effects on the economy. First, subsidized firmsand industries will be
larger, while those doing the subsidizingwill be smaller. This misalloca-
tion of resources leads to a deadweightefficiency loss. While even with
our new data sources it isdifficult to attach an exact dollar value to this
loss, we argue that it may be substantial.Additionally, there is an effect
on aggregateunemployment, because it is just those workers who are
most likely to be regularly unemployedwho are most subsidized. Again,
the data is not available to arrive at precise estimatesof the effect, but we
find that UI cross-subsidization may be responsiblefor substantial unem-
ployment in such industries as construction.
REFERENCES
Anderson, Patricia M., and Bruce D Meyer (1992)."The Incentives and Cross-
Subsidies of the UI Payroll Tax" (with Patricia Anderson).Working paper,
March 1992.
and (1993). "Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Lay-
off Incentives and Cross-Subsidies." Journal of Labor Economics11.
Atkinson, Anthony B., and John Micklewright (1991)."Unemployment Compen-
sation and Labor Market Transitions: A CriticalReview." Journal of Economic
Literature 24, 1679-1727.
Becker, Joseph M. (1972). Experience Rating in UnemploymentInsurance: An Ex-
periment in Competitive Socialism. Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins University
Press.
Brechling, Frank (1977). "The Incentive Effects of the U.S.Unemployment Insur-
ance Tax." In Research in LaborEconomics, vol. 1. Ronald Ehrenberg, ed. Green-
wich, CT: JAI Press.
Deere, Donald R. (1991). "Unemployment Insuranceand Employment." Journal
of Labor Economics 9, 307-324.
Feldstein, Martin S. (1978). "The Effect of UnemploymentInsurance on Tempo-
rary Layoff Unemployment." AmericanEconomic Review 68, 834-846.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. (1986). "The Demand for Labor in theLong Run." In
Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelterand Richard Layard, eds.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
(1990). "Unemployment Insurance Financing, Short-TimeCompensa-
tion, and Labor Demand." Research in Labor Economics11, 241-270.
Hartley, H. 0., J. N. K. Rao, and L. LaMotte (1978). "ASimple Synthesis-Based
Method of Variance Component Estimation." Biometrics 34,233-244.
Marks, Denton (1984). "Incomplete Experience Rating inState Unemployment
Insurance." Monthly Labor Review 107, 45-49.
Munts, Raymond C., and Ephraim Asher (1981)."Cross-Subsidies Among In-
dustries From 1969 to 1978." Unemployment Compensation:Studies and Research,
277-297.
National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation &Workers' Compensa-144Anderson and Meyer
lion (various years). Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws. Wash-
ington, DC: NFUCWC.
Topel, Robert H. (1983). "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance." American
Economic Review 73, 541-559.
(1990). "Financing Unemployment Insurance: History, Incentives, and
Reform." In Unemployment Insurance. W. Lee Hansen and James F. Byers, eds.
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.